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I. Introduction 
In May 2006, Warren Buffet’s US-based Berkshire Hathaway acquired 80% of the stock of 
Israel-based Iscar Metalworking Companies for USD 4 billion, this being its first acquisition of 
a firm outside the United States. A while after the acquisition, Mr Buffet said in an interview 
that “Iscar is a dream deal. It has surpassed all the expectations I had when buying the 
company and my expectations had been very high”. Isaac Tshuva is an Israeli businessman 
who started his career as a small local real estate entrepreneur and nowadays has the 
controlling interest in several transnational investment and holding companies. In 2004 
Mr Tshuva bought the Plaza Hotel on Fifth Avenue for USD 675 million. These two deals, 
despite their outstanding value in Israeli terms, are only two examples of the increasing 
involvement of Israeli business people and firms in the global economy to an extent that 
would have been deemed inconceivable or impossible 20 years ago.  
In 1984, Israel’s public debt/GDP ratio reached 284% and the State of Israel was close to 
debt repudiation. At the end of 2006 the ratio was 87%, and at the end of the second quarter 
of 2007 the economy’s total net liabilities were about USD 22 billion, with a total net debt 
instrument asset surplus of USD 38 billion.
4 These factors imply an improvement in the 
financial position of the economy and a rapid increase in its openness, expressed by the 
growing activity of Israeli residents abroad (Graph 9). Twenty years ago the government was 
diverting a large part of private savings to its budget via administrative measures: there were 
many restrictions on financial activity, including foreign exchange activity of both Israelis 
abroad and non-residents in the domestic economy (Ben Bassat (2002)). The supervision of 
foreign exchange activity had been very strict, and it was almost impossible to do business 
without the intervention or the permission of the Israeli authorities. For example, there was a 
quota on the amount of foreign currency that Israelis could take abroad, and residents could 
not hold real assets abroad (Michaely (2007)). 
Over the last 20 years, Israel has moved from almost complete control and deep government 
involvement in every segment of the financial markets to a regime with a practically 
independent central bank (see more about the independence of the central bank in 
Cukierman (2007)) and free capital flows, having implemented many structural and financial 
reforms. This transformation eased the constraints that had restricted the financial activity of 
Israelis abroad and of non-residents in the local economy, improved Israel’s position in the 
global economy and contributed to domestic growth. 
Due to growing fiscal expenditure, increasing debt to finance large deficits (Graphs 3 and 4) 
and an accommodative monetary policy, in 1974–84 the Israeli economy went through a 
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period of high inflation and poor economic performance in terms of growth and productivity, a 
period known as the lost decade. Following the 1967 and 1973 wars, defence expenditure 
escalated and so did social expenditure. The substantial financial needs of the government 
impelled it to expand its already intensive involvement in the financial market in order to 
reduce its deficit financing cost. In addition, during the lost decade there were large deficits in 
the current account. The government reacted to these shocks with recurrent devaluations of 
the shekel, raising the prices of supervised products and cutting subsidies, steps which were 
not accompanied by the appropriate monetary policy and which caused inflationary bumps.  
In 1985, after the inflation rate soared to unprecedented levels and the economy almost 
reached the stage of debt repudiation, an economic stabilisation programme was 
implemented. This programme required new standards of fiscal and monetary discipline, 
expressed in particular through restrictions on increases in public expenditure and legislation 
that prevented the Bank of Israel from supplying the government’s financial needs (known as 
the No-Printing Law). The implementation of the programme and the adherence to its 
principles led to the recovery of the economy, which eventually improved the credibility of 
macroeconomic policy.  
The stabilisation programme changed the macroeconomic fundamentals of the Israeli 
economy. Among these changes, the Israeli money market, capital market, foreign currency 
market, pension funds, banking system and tax system went through many reforms 
(Table 2). Based on international experience, the reforms were implemented gradually, in 
order to integrate Israel into the global economy with minimal shocks to financial stability. 
The integration process was also supported by the growing interest of investors in emerging 
economies. However, there is still a need for more financial reform in the future, with the 
objective of improving the competitiveness of the local economy, making it a more attractive 
business location for both residents and non-residents, and supporting economic growth. 
In the rest of this paper we discuss the macroeconomic and institutional background to the 
financial reforms, which emphasises the importance of applying new discipline to Israel’s 
economic administration as formulated in the mid-1980s. We then describe what was done 
during the economic stabilisation programme of 1985 and how it contributed to the 
implementation of economic reforms, while focusing on what was done during the liberalisation 
process. We sum up with an example demonstrating the resilience of the economy.  
II.  Financial restraint and economic stagnation, 1974–84 
Fiscal and monetary policy 
Israel went through a period of high inflation, economic stagnation and financial restraint from 
the early 1970s until the mid-1980s. This period, known as the lost decade, came after 15 
years of relatively low fiscal deficits, low inflation and strong economic growth. In 1985, when 
the economy almost reached the stage of debt repudiation, a stabilisation programme 
established new macroeconomic discipline and set the conditions for economic reforms and 
a price stability regime. The processes Israel went through have characteristics similar to 
those in the great inflationary periods described in Sargent (1981) – where governments’ 
financial needs led to hyperinflation that ended with the implementation of new fiscal and 
monetary regimes. 
The inflationary process in the economy during the lost decade began to accelerate in the 
wake of the severe shocks that followed the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which resulted in a 
drastic increase in defence expenditure to over 30% of GDP (Graph 1). An additional major 
component of government expenditure during that time was growing social expenditure, 
intended mainly to preserve high employment and to achieve other political and social 
objectives (Graph 2, Barkai and Liviatan (2007)). This resulted in an increase in government BIS Papers No 44  291
 
 
expenditure to over 75% of GDP during most of the period, high public deficits, and a 
growing public debt that reached almost 284% of GDP in 1984 (Graph 3). Graph 4 illustrates 
the inflation rate from 1970 to 1990. 
Graph 1 
Defence expenditure, 1970–2006 














Source: Central Bureau of Statistics. 
Graph 2 
GDP growth and the unemployment rate, 1970–2006 





























































































































































































Fiscal parameters, 1970–2008 















Data for 1970–80: according to old SNA; thereafter according to new SNA. Broken lines indicate 
extrapolations. 
1  2008–09: Bank of Israel forecast. 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics.  
Graph 4 
Inflation in the previous 12 months, end of year, 1970–90 
In per cent 
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Many papers were written about the proceedings during the era of high inflation (for example, 
Bruno and Fischer (1984)). These describe the attempts to stabilise inflation and inflation 
expectations and to soften inflation impacts – including such steps as the cut in subsidies 
aimed at reducing public expenditure, measures aimed at limiting price increases to a certain 
rate, and wage indexation mechanisms. However, we would stress the high nominal and real 
price of the economic developments during those years: high deficits in the current account 
and the public budget, and high inflation. These developments led to controls being imposed 
on the foreign exchange market, international financial and current account transactions, and 
the channelling of a large part of private savings into financing the public debt.  
Financial markets 
During the lost decade the economy was characterised by fiscal dominance; monetary policy 
was accommodative, dominated mostly by the fiscal and political considerations of the 
government, leaving no room for significant actions by the central bank (Barkai and Liviatan 
(2007)). In addition, because of the intervention of the government in financial markets and 
due to discrimination in credit allocation and intervention in the money market, the sphere of 
influence of monetary policy was narrow (Cukierman (2007)). There was no monetary anchor 
and the government reacted to deficits in the current account by repeated devaluations of the 
currency, increasing the prices of supervised products and cutting subsidies. The Bank of 
Israel had to supply the government’s credit needs by printing money, and its actions during 
the great inflationary period were mostly concentrated in stabilising the inflationary alignment 
by considerable sterilisation, and had a smaller influence on the inflation trend (Barkai and 
Liviatan (2007)). 
The inflationary process was influenced by global factors as well, such as the energy crisis of 
the 1970s. The Israeli reaction was a far-reaching indexation of prices and wages to restrain 
the real influence of inflation. The government did not adapt its agenda to the changing local 
and global economic conditions – the increase in defence expenditure, a slowdown in 
economic and demographic growth and global stagnation, and the deepening of the 
economic crisis.  
Government intervention in the markets included administrative restrictions, exceptional 
liquidity rates, credit quotas and exemptions, restrictions on international capital flows and 
discriminatory tax and interest rates. The government discriminated against borrowing by 
private firms by means of taxation and controls on private bond issues. For example, 
institutional investors – for example pension funds and trust funds – had to invest 95% of 
their total annual net inflow of sources in non-tradable government bonds; 60% of short-term 
credit and 65% of housing loans were directed by the government (Ben Bassat (2002)). 
The array of prohibitions and exemptions, the wide range of interest rates, and the measures 
taken by the government to secure its control of the financial market made the market 
structure complex, reduced its efficiency, and increased the expenses of financial 
intermediaries and regulators. This was expressed in a high average cost of finance. For 
example, the interest on foreign credit in 1985 ranged from 8.3% for the preferred groups to 
33.8% for loans subject to administrative limits (Ben Bassat (2007)).  
The foreign exchange market 
As stated above, during the lost decade there were strict controls on foreign exchange 
activity. However, over the years there was a slow easing of those controls, particularly those 
on current account transactions. Consequently tariffs on imports were lifted, mostly due to 294  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
agreements signed with Israel’s main trading partners.
5 Starting in 1991, protection against 
imports from other areas was gradually lifted as well.  
A change in the ruling party in 1977 introduced a revolutionary liberalisation process in the 
foreign exchange market that eventually failed. The process included two major components: 
easing of capital flows and a change in the exchange rate system from a crawling peg to a 
free float. Opening the economy to capital flows against the background of unstable 
macroeconomic conditions created large demand for foreign funds and led to great monetary 
expansion and to further devaluations that only increased the inflationary spiral (Michaely 
(2007)). In 1979 the Bank of Israel ordered Israeli firms and households to stop taking short- 
and medium-term credit in foreign exchange. Later on, the prohibition was replaced with a 
system of fines imposed on short- and medium-term credit in foreign exchange that were 
removed only a few years later with the implementation of liberalisation in the foreign 
exchange market. The main lesson learned from this episode was that capital flows cannot 
be liberalised without associated adjustments of the financial system and of monetary policy.  
III.  The stabilisation programme, 1985 
Towards mid-1985 it became harder for the government to increase its already high debt in 
order to finance the public deficit, and the Israeli economy almost reached the stage of debt 
repudiation. The large fiscal deficit (Graph 3) became particularly problematic due to the 
increasing difficulty of sterilising the large monetary injections by selling government bonds, 
and the government had to finance its deficit by drawing on its foreign exchange reserves. In 
addition, the current account deficit continued to be relatively large and resulted in recurrent 
currency devaluations, and the money printing due to the large government deficit 
strengthened the inflationary spiral. These circumstances required a determined joint 
programme which would commit the government and the central bank to a different 
discipline.  
The stabilisation policy was implemented with the assistance of experts from academia, the 
US government, the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Israel. It was based on several 
principles: establishment of fiscal balance and perseverance in fiscal discipline for the future, 
and ending the ability of the Bank of Israel to increase the money supply to finance the public 
deficit; dealing simultaneously with the balance of payments and inflation issues within the 
framework of a nominal anchor. Structural and financial reforms were postponed to a later 
stage.  
Within the framework of the programme, a nominal anchor to restrain price increases was 
adopted and a commitment to new fiscal discipline aimed at reducing the debt/GDP ratio was 
undertaken. Accordingly, a large cut in the fiscal deficit was made to stop the need to print 
money (Graph 3) and the exchange rate was chosen as an additional nominal anchor to 
restrain inflation; it was first pegged to the US dollar, and later to a currency basket. To 
protect itself from a drastic increase in real wages which could encourage the inflationary 
spiral, the government had signed temporary wage freeze agreements with the labour 
unions, which themselves signed a temporary agreement to freeze prices with the 
Manufacturers’ Association.  
An important objective of the stabilisation programme was to reduce the ability of the 
government to finance its deficit by directing the activity in financial markets and by 
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intervening directly in the management of monetary policy, and to give the central bank 
greater independence in the management of monetary policy. Accordingly, the No-Printing 
Law was enacted, which prevented the central bank from giving the government credit to 
finance its deficits, and direct credit was gradually abandoned. The Bank of Israel was also 
released from supporting government bond prices, so it had a wider basis from which to 
affect price stabilisation and was eventually able to manage an independent interest rate 
policy (Cukierman (2007)).  
The stabilisation strategy succeeded remarkably well in supporting the disinflation process 
and in improving macroeconomic fundamentals. In just a few quarters, inflation decreased 
from 400% to 20% (Graph 5). From 1987 the exchange rate regime became more flexible: a 
horizontal exchange rate band was adopted for direct intervention on the foreign exchange 
market, with an upper and lower boundary of ±3% from the central rate. From the early 
1990s the exchange rate was replaced as the main monetary anchor by an inflation targeting 
regime, with Israel being one of the first countries to operate such a regime, and the interest 
rate became the main monetary policy tool. After the adoption of inflation targeting the 
flexibility of the exchange rate was further strengthened and the exchange rate band was 
widened, until its complete cancellation in 2003.
6 Graph 5 illustrates the gradual decrease of 
inflation rates and the adoption of inflation targets from the early 1990s. These are reflected 
in the reduction of the public debt from 284% of GDP at the end of 1984 to 199% at the end 
of 1985. 
Graph 5 
Inflation in the 12 months and inflation target, 1990–2007 















Sources: Bank of Israel; Central Bureau of Statistics. 
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The determination of the government to succeed in stabilising the economy and its 
adherence to the new macroeconomic discipline contributed to the credibility of the 
programme and of the new economic policy framework, and were highly important to the 
success of the programme in the short and longer runs. A special US grant of USD 1.5 billion 
(about 6% of GDP), spread over two years, which the government used only as a financial 
safety net, boosted confidence in the programme. A further benefit that enhanced the image 
of the economy was an improvement in US aid in 1985: the conversion of US loans into 
grants at an annual rate of USD 0.9 billion. 
IV.  An era of reforms in Israeli financial markets, from 1987 till today 
After the 1985 stabilisation programme, Israel’s macroeconomic fundamentals gradually 
improved and so did the credibility of the Israeli economy, for these benefited from the 
general interest in emerging economies. As a result, the economic conditions needed for far-
reaching financial and structural reforms and full liberalisation of the foreign exchange market 
emerged. These reforms were implemented via a gradual reduction of government 
intervention in domestic financial and money markets (Gottlieb and Blejer (2002); Ben Bassat 
(2007); Michaely (2007)). Yet, much remains to be done to increase competition in the 
financial markets and the banking sector, and to introduce modern financial instruments.  
The 20-year transition to a market economy proceeded along a number of channels 
simultaneously, which contributed to (1) the establishment of strong macroeconomic 
discipline to consolidate the credence given to the economy by investors (which is also a 
condition for the development of financial markets and reforms); (2) a strengthening of the 
stability of the local banking system; and (3) the development of financial instruments to 
manage foreign exchange risks and to increase activity in the local economy. The 
government gradually reduced its involvement in the domestic money and capital markets, 
removed restrictions on international capital flows and laid the foundations for increased 
competition between financial intermediaries. This shift included many measures such as 
changes in the money, foreign exchange and capital markets and many changes in the 
composition of the budget, influenced by privatisation and other structural changes. Table 1 
presents the share of directed credit in total bank credit and the differential between the 
interest rate on short-term credit and on deposits in selected years. The data illustrate the 
change over time and the reduction in government control of the market. Table 2 presents 
the main financial and economic reforms during this period. 
 
Table 1 
The outcome of government intervention  
in the market, selected years  
In per cent 
Year  Share of directed credit in 
total bank credit 
Net interest spread on short-
term credit and deposits 
1985 60.5  40.7 
1990 25.4  16.4 
1995 8.2  9.2 
2000 4.0  7.8 
2004 5.7  7.1 





Selected economic reforms in Israel since the 1980s 
Sphere Main  parameters  Implementation year of 
selected measures
1 
Removal of administrative 
restrictions on deposits and 
credit 
Since 1987 
Reduction in direct 
discriminatory credit  
1982–90 
Use of new monetary policy 
tools 
Makam nominal bill: since 
1987. Auctions for commercial 
bank deposits: since 1995 
Money market 
Decrease in liquidity rates, and 
avoidance of their use as a 
monetary tool 
Since 1987 
Reduction in requirements for 
institutional investors to invest 
in government bonds 
Since 1987 
Removal of the constraints on 
issuing private bonds 
Since 1987 
Capital market 
Gradual elimination of the 
issuance of non-tradable 
government bonds 
1987–2003 
Liberalisation of the foreign 
exchange market 
1987–2003  Foreign currency market 
Revocation of tax on capital 
flows 
2003–04 
Elimination of tax discrimination  Since 1987 (eliminating tax and 
subsidies discrimination on 
production factors and goods) 
Tax system 
Taxation of financial income  Since 2003 
Programme to attain actuarial 
balance in pension funds 
funded by the government, 
employers and employees 
Since 1995  Pension funds 
Raising of retirement age  2004 
Splitting of non-banking 
corporations and subsidies 
Since the 1990s 
Splitting-off of the management 
of provident and mutual funds 
from the banks 
Banking system 
Splitting-off of underwriting and 
consulting from the banks 
2005 
(Bachar Reform) 
1  In some cases implementation was spread over a few years; some of the reforms were partial. 
Sources: Ben Bassat (2002); Ben Bassat (2007); Michaely (2007). 
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The planning and implementation of further financial reforms in the Israeli financial market is 
still continuing. Current working groups and interministerial committees are working on 
deepening the financial market and making it more competitive and attractive for investors. 
Among current matters being promoted are the development of the repo and securitisation 
markets and a deepening of competition in the banking system. These reforms also 
contribute to the integration of Israeli financial markets into the global economy and to the 
economy’s financial resilience. 
Current account transactions were almost completely free when the liberalisation of the 
financial account began. Hence, we focus on the reforms that were part of the financial 
account liberalisation process, and their influence on capital flows and the resilience of the 
economy. The process which resulted in the full liberalisation of the foreign exchange market 
in Israel ran from 1987 to 2003, with the objective of abolishing foreign exchange control and 
achieving full convertibility of the new shekel. This process was part of a strategy to increase 
the openness of the economy, as it was recognised that the benefits from liberalisation would 
compensate for its costs – deriving mostly from the required structural and institutional 
preparations for the development of the capital markets, and from the increase in financial 
stability risks. The full list of restrictions that still applied to foreign exchange and current 
account transactions in the Israeli economy in 1987 can be found in Michaely (2007). 
The liberalisation process brought the economy from a situation of almost full government 
control of capital flows and activity in foreign exchange to one of utilisation of relative 
advantages, free capital movements and much more competitive and efficient capital 
markets.  
The liberalisation of the foreign exchange market was completed in 2003, when all 
restrictions on capital transactions were eliminated. However, the road to full liberalisation 
also included a few noteworthy landmarks (Graph 6). In 1993 the export premium 
programme and a general surcharge on imports were abolished, after which there were no 
restrictions on current account transactions. In 1998 there was another significant landmark, 
when the almost full list of restrictions was replaced by a list stating only a few components 
that remained forbidden – many transactions in the current and capital accounts were 
permitted from then on, unless they were stated in the list. In the year 2000 the remaining 
restrictions applied only to the activity of institutional investors, who were allowed to invest 
only 20% of their assets abroad. In 2003 all restrictions were removed and Israel’s foreign 
exchange regime became totally free. 
Graph 6 
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The sequence of the liberalisation process was designed to integrate Israel into the global 
markets gradually, with minimal shocks to financial stability. Accordingly, the sequence was 
set according to the following criteria:  
(1) The type and extent of capital movement and liquidity: short-term capital flows have 
higher volatility and liquidity and they are considered more risky to financial stability. 
Accordingly, the sequence of liberalisation was to allow free long-term capital imports, 
including direct investments, and investments in securities and long-term bonds before the 
shorter-term transactions. Capital outflows gradually became feasible only at a later stage, 
and again, long-term flows were allowed before their shorter-term counterparts. Restrictions 
on capital outflows by domestic residents were also removed gradually, starting with those 
on long-term financial investments; only at a later stage were they removed from shorter-
term investments as well.  
(2) Sectors of the economy: priority was given to removal of restrictions on the activity of the 
business sector and of non-residents, because the government considered that these 
sectors could boost the domestic economy’s integration into the global economy and 
contribute to its growth. Restrictions on the activity of households and institutional investors 
were removed only at a later stage. Households were permitted first to make financial 
investments abroad, subject to tax discrimination, which was not applicable to the financial 
activity of the business sector. The tax discrimination was totally removed only in 2003–04, a 
while after the restrictions on investments were removed as well. The holding of foreign 
currency bank accounts abroad by households was delayed to later stages in the process. 
The institutional investors sector, which represents the main part of households’ savings, 
was left to the end of the process in view of this sector’s considerable potential to transfer 
capital abroad.  
V.  The influence of the liberalisation process on capital flows 
The increased capital flows into the Israeli economy were the outcome of a combination of 
good luck and good policy. The liberalisation process, alongside other macroeconomic 
reforms and improvements in the fundamentals of the economy, altered the magnitude and 
composition of the financial account, increased the economy’s accessibility to world markets 
and improved its credit rating. In addition to the impact of the internal changes mentioned 
above, the Israeli economy benefited from its inclusion among emerging markets and the 
growing interest of foreign international investors in such markets. 
From 1997, Israel’s financial activity vis-à-vis other countries underwent significant changes, 
reflected both in an increased volume of capital flows and in a growing number of 
participants. A few simultaneous developments contributed to this evolution: the liberalisation 
of the foreign exchange market, which offered more possibilities for Israelis to raise capital 
abroad and to invest abroad; increased exposure of the economy to external factors, which 
was a part of the globalisation process and which was expressed, inter alia, by increased 
capital flows to and from emerging markets; and tax reforms that reduced distortions in the 
taxation of financial assets, contributing to increased investments abroad by Israelis (mostly 
households and institutional investors). All of these developments came in addition to the fast 
expansion of the local financial market and of the Israeli high-tech industry and its position as 
a leading sector in the economy. 
During the liberalisation years, non-resident investment in equity and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Israel grew rapidly (Graph 7), and the proportion of tradable investment 
and activity in the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange in the economy also increased (Graph 8), all of 
which contributed to a change in the composition of the assets and liabilities portfolio of the 
economy. The change in the net external (debt instrument) liabilities position of the economy 
from positive to negative (Graph 9) shows the increase in investment in debt instruments of 300  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
Israelis abroad – the economy had moved from a position of net borrower to net lender – and 
reflects the greater openness of the economy. Accordingly, there was a substantial increase 
of more than 160% in the assets of Israelis abroad, mainly in direct investments, tradable 
bonds and foreign exchange credit, and an increase of over 95% in Israeli residents’ 
liabilities, with the main growth being in FDI and in tradable bonds. Over the years, the share 
of long-term capital inflows increased and so did the economy’s credit rating, providing 
further witness to its fundamental credibility (Gottlieb and Blejer (2002); Rehavi and 
Weingarten (2006)).  
Graph 7 
Non-resident investment in Israel, 1985–2006 
In billions of US dollars 
 
Source: Bank of Israel. 
One main outcome of the increased exposure of the economy to capital flows and other 
financial reforms is the enlargement in the number and variety of participants in financial 
activity. For example there has been an expansion in the Israeli private non-banking sector, 
which has boosted the raising of capital abroad and decreased the dependency of residents 
on the traditional financial intermediaries, such as the Israeli government and domestic 
banks. As a result, the traditional intermediaries’ share in Israel’s total external liabilities has 
declined, while the share of the private non-banking sector has risen (Rehavi and 
Weingarten (2006)). 
Following international experience and the unsuccessful liberalisation process of the 1970s, 
the gradual removal of restrictions on foreign exchange activity was followed by a shift from 
supervision by the central bank to documentation of the activity of financial entities (Ozer et 
al (2005)). The slow process of foreign exchange market liberalisation enabled the Bank of 
Israel to progressively develop a data infrastructure that documents the activity of Israeli 
residents in foreign currency markets and non-residents’ activity in local markets. The 
reporting network includes reports from various financial intermediaries, primarily banks, on 
their activity abroad and in foreign currency, as well as direct reports from corporations and 
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Graph 9 
Net external (debt instrument) liabilities position 
In billions of US dollars 
 





















1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Investment
Realisation302  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
Monitoring capital flows and trends in new shekel/forex markets contributes to the 
management of monetary policy and the maintenance of financial stability; in particular it 
contributes to early identification of developments essential to the decision-making process, 
especially in small open economies. Therefore, in its meetings, the monetary policy forum at 
the Bank of Israel receives a detailed summary of the financial stability of the economy and 
of the past and expected trends and developments in the foreign exchange market, based, 
among other things, on data on foreign exchange activity. In addition, the participants receive 
an evaluation of the economy’s exposure to economic risks, applying to the activity of both 
residents and non-residents. 
VI.  Free capital movements and the resilience of the economy 
Since 1987, the Israeli economy has experienced a few major events which undermined 
financial stability and were reflected by substantial depreciation and a marked increase in 
exchange rate volatility. Three examples of such events are the worldwide financial crises in 
1998, local developments that affected the yield-versus-risk ratios in the economy in 2002, 
and the impact of the Second Lebanon War, in 2006. We will focus on the impact of the last 
event.  
The Second Lebanon War began in mid-July 2006 and lasted 32 days. The war led to a 
slowdown in economic activity in the north of Israel and also had an impact on the rest of the 
country. During the period of the war, business production fell by an annualised 4.1% and 
aggregate GDP fell by an annualised 0.8%, due to the growth in public spending and the 
slowdown in economic activity. However, the slowdown was scarcely apparent in domestic 
uses and mainly influenced exports and inventories. 
Graph 10 
The new shekel/US dollar exchange rate  
during the Second Lebanon War 
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In spite of the war in the north, financial markets (foreign currency and domestic bonds) 
showed steadfastness throughout the second half of 2006, with annual GDP growth of 5.1% 
(Graph 2). In the first few days of the war the new shekel depreciated by 3% (Graph 10), and 
exchange rate risk, measured by the implied volatility of (mainly short-term) new 
shekel/dollar options, rose by 2.5% to 8%. Three weeks after the hostilities began, the 
exchange rate and implied volatility reverted to their prewar levels, and summarising the 
whole of the period of the war, exchange rate risk was steady.  
During the Second Lebanon War the Bank of Israel published a few press releases in order 
to calm the markets and to strengthen confidence in Israeli markets and the credence of 
economic policy. The reaction of investors, foreign and domestic, throughout the war was 
milder than it had been during earlier crises, when households had reacted by buying 
significant quantities of foreign currency (Bank of Israel (2007a,b)).  
During the above-mentioned events, the Bank of Israel refrained from intervening in the 
foreign exchange market, but reacted vigorously with the interest rate tool or with relevant 
press releases to strengthen public confidence in economic policy with a view to 
counteracting processes that could undermine financial stability.  
VII. Conclusion 
The economic events of the past 30 years in Israel give an example of an economy that 
moved from a situation of almost complete government control over financial markets, with 
economic institutions serving the government’s financial needs, to an economy with strict 
fiscal discipline, an independent monetary policy and open and free financial markets. The 
gradual move to a market economy in Israel has expanded its economic resources and 
increased its growth potential.  
Since the implementation of the stabilisation programme in 1985, fiscal discipline has been 
maintained despite frequent changes of government and high defence risks, and a 
continuous process of economic reforms has been pursued. Evidence of the improvement in 
the credence of the economy and its adherence to stable economic policy is provided by a 
Standard & Poor’s announcement regarding the decision to raise Israel’s long-term foreign 
currency sovereign credit rating from A– to A at the end of November 2007:  
“The ratings are moreover supported by Israel’s prosperous economy and strong political 
commitment to long-term fiscal consolidation … Fiscal consolidation intensified in 2007, and 
the general government debt burden continued its downward trend to 82% of GDP at year-
end 2007 ... Israel has additional borrowing flexibility due to the loan guarantee program by 
the United States, its key ally ...”. 
Much has to be done in the future to make the Israeli capital market more compatible with 
international standards. Continuing the gradual economic reforms that began 20 years ago is 
essential to achieving increased capital market efficiency and stability. However, these things 
can be achieved only if the economy continues to adhere to strict fiscal rules and a 
responsible monetary policy that will reinforce its credibility and contribute to growth and 




Bank of Israel (2007a): Inflation Report 2006, July–December, February. 
——— (2007b): Annual Report 2006, April. 
Barkai, H and N Liviatan (2007): “A Monetary History”, in The Bank of Israel: Selected Topics 
in Israel’s Monetary Policy, vol 1, Oxford University Press. 
Ben Bassat, A (2002): “The Obstacle Course to a Market Economy in Israel”, in A Ben 
Bassat,  The Israeli Economy, 1985–1998: From Government Intervention to Market 
Economics, MIT Press.  
——— (2007): “Conflict, Interest Groups and Politics in Structural Reforms”, unpublished 
working paper. 
Bruno, M (1989): “Israel’s Crisis and Economic Reform in Historical Perspective”, Economic 
Quarterly, vol 40, no 141 (in Hebrew). 
Bruno, M and S Fischer (1984): “The Inflationary Process in Israel: Shocks and 
Accommodation”, NBER Working Papers, no w1483. 
Cukierman, A (2007): “De Jure, De Facto, and Desired Independence: The Bank of Israel as 
a Case Study”, in N Liviatan and H Barkai (eds), The Bank of Israel: Selected Topics in 
Israel’s Monetary Policy, vol 2, Oxford University Press. 
Djivre, J and D Tsiddon (2002): “A Monetary Labyrinth: Instruments and the Conduct of 
Monetary Policy in Israel, 1987–1998”, in A Ben Bassat, The Israeli Economy, 1985–1998: 
From Government Intervention to Market Economics, MIT Press. 
Gottlieb, D and M Blejer (2002): “Liberalization in the Capital Account of the Balance of 
Payments”, in A Ben Bassat, The Israeli Economy, 1985–1998: From Government 
Intervention to Market Economics, MIT Press. 
Michaely, M (2007): “The Liberalization in Israel’s Foreign Exchange Market, 1950–2002”, in 
N Liviatan and H Barkai (eds), The Bank of Israel: Selected Topics in Israel’s Monetary 
Policy, vol 2, Oxford University Press. 
Ozer, B, S Reiss and Y Soffer (2005): Israel’s Financial Account Liberalization, Foreign 
Exchange Activity Department, Bank of Israel. 
Rehavi, Y and A Weingarten (2006): Israel’s Financial Account, 1998 to 2005, Foreign 
Exchange Activity Department, Bank of Israel (in Hebrew). 
Reiss, S (2006a): The Meaning of Short-Term Capital Import to the Economy, Foreign 
Exchange Activity Department, Bank of Israel, unpublished. 
——— (2006b): The Exposure of the Non-Banking Private Sector to Exchange Rate Risks – 
Short-Term Implications, Foreign Exchange Activity Department, Bank of Israel, unpublished. 
Sargent, T J (1981): “The Ends of Four Big Inflations”, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Working Paper no 158.  
Strawcynski, M and J Zeira (2002): “Reducing the Relative Size of Government in Israel After 
1985”, in A Ben Bassat, The Israeli Economy, 1985–1998: From Government Intervention to 
Market Economics, MIT Press. 